Surrounded by people-seas of them-the crowd a huge, changing thought.
This essay asks why, at a time when we are once again turning our attention to the immanent potentials of groups, we remain so afraid of crowds? I explore this question in three stages:
1) I start from the apparently antithetical opposition between crowds and multitudes in current social theory. I emphasize how these figures represent radically different approaches to the emergent energies of groups. Ostensibly, crowd theory tells of how these emergent energies threaten the strenuously achieved autonomous liberal subject. Multitude theory offers a postliberal alternative; it takes the collective rather than the individual as the site of freedom, but-it turns out-only if the multitude's emergent energies remain pure, uncompromised by actually existing social institutions.
2) Through a close analysis of the respective figures of crowds and multitudes I reveal an impasse at the heart of each. I then suggest that the relationship between these two impasses suggests an unacknowledged negative intimacy between crowd theory and multitude theory.
3) I move toward my conclusion by suggesting that this negative intimacy, this paradoxically dynamic deadlock, could usefully be rethought as the positive foundation for a way of thinking about the social potential of group energies that relies neither on the fortress of the autonomous liberal subject (crowd theory) nor on a principled but critically disabling attachment to immanent, unmediated potentiality (multitude theory). The constantly restaged opposition between these two figures also works, I suggest, to reproduce a misleading epochal distinction between past and present phases of modernity.
Let me begin, then, with the peculiar story of the different eras to which crowds and multitudes supposedly belong.
Crowds: Allochronic
The first thing that stands out in current commentary is the way that crowds are pushed into the past. Their relation to the present is, to adapt a term from Johannes Fabian, allochronic.
3 It is true that crowd theory has, after a good half century out in the cold, recently been readmitted into the living room of polite sociological inquiry. 4 Even so, crowds are generally considered in a register of intellectual history where they are treated as the paradigmatic social formation of an earlier "mass" phase of modernity.
5
This is roughly how the story goes: crowds and mobs take shape and flourish in the atmosphere of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, where they express the raw potentials of mass democratization and the collective dangers of urban anonymity. From where we stand today, it looks as if the middle of the twentieth century saw the culmination of the crowd, as totalitarianisms in the East and West married the visceral energies of masses to the iron cage of bureaucratic domination. In the postwar period the crowd, that monogram of mass society, seems outmoded as a social theoretical construct, as both liberal politics and consumer markets become ever more diversified. mation evocative of an older politics that can be quoted in contemporary mobilizations, "just as typewriting now continues to play a role under the regime of digital writing and printing."
7
This story about changing forms of political representation rests, in turn, on an underlying narrative about an epochal shift in the deployment of modern power. Crowds seem to belong to that earlier, sepia-tinted version of industrial modernity that Michel Foucault called the society of discipline where, in the words of Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, power worked "by structuring the parameters and limits of thought and practice, sanctioning and prescribing normal and/or deviant behaviours."
8 Following Gilles Deleuze's rereading of Foucault, 9 Hardt and Negri offer us multitudes as the vitally collective social form of the "control society." Here, "mechanisms of command become ever more 'democratic,' ever more immanent to the social field, distributed through the brains and bodies of the citizens" (E, p. 23). Unlike the old disciplinary binary of the normal and the pathological, command by control is "fractal and aims to integrate conflicts not by imposing a coherent social apparatus but by controlling differences" (E, p. 340). Mass politics, with their "centralized forms of revolutionary dictatorship and command," have given way to "network organizations that displace authority in collaborative relationships." 10 We have moved from the assembly line to the network, where the media of labor and revolution alike are "communication, collaboration, and cooperation" (M, p. xv). Marx and Engels had their crowds; Hardt and Negri bring us multitudes.
The point of this story is not only to describe shifting modes of production and governmentality. It is also an inquiry into the place of vital energy within modernity. The implication is that in the age of crowds, human vitality was repressed by top-down monumentalism and massivity. In the age of multitudes, by contrast, the élan vital of collective creative energy is no longer external to the requirements of industrial discipline. It has now become constitutive of the reproduction of the ruling order.
11 In the old 11. Looking back, Hardt and Negri apprehend the philosophical discourse of modernity as a confrontation between a dominant story of rationalization and a persistent, resistant vitalist strain: "In modernity the philosophies of vitalism could still protest against the damaging effects of technology, industrialization, and the commodification of existence by affirming the natural life force. Even in Martin Heidegger's critique of technology, when vitalism has become days, crowds threatened power from outside; the crowd was the rabble that had to be kept from the gates. The emergent energy of multitudes, on the other hand, is at once the sensible substance and the intimate enemy of constituted authority.
One might raise all kinds of empirical objections to this kind of epochal periodization. That is not my purpose here. Nor do I read its intention as literally historical; clearly the figures of discipline and control are to some extent intended as ideal-typical heuristic constructs, elements of which may be discerned in all kinds of combinations in any given situation. Nevertheless, when it comes to the relation between crowds and multitudes, the lines are much more emphatically drawn. It would not be an exaggeration to say that the coherence of the figure of the multitude, in the writings of Hardt and Negri, depends on its opposition to the figure of the crowd. What is it, then, about the crowd that makes it so poisonous for the present? Why is it so rank?
Crowds: Politically Incorrect
At first sight this might seem to be an idle question. Do not the classic crowd writings simply bristle with prejudice? In his genre-inaugurating essay The Crowd, Gustave Le Bon sneers: "In crowds it is stupidity and not mother-wit that is accumulated"
12 and proceeds to assert that "by the mere fact that he forms part of an organised crowd, a man descends several rungs in the ladder of civilisation."
13 The motifs of regression and immoderation allow crowd dynamics to be explained by reference to a generalized amalgam that equates savages, women, and children. A crowd, wrote Le Bon, is "like a savage [,] not prepared to admit that anything can come between its desire and the realisation of its desire," and, furthermore, "distinguished by feminine characteristics . . . like women, it goes at once to extremes" (C, pp. 12, 13, 22). William McDougall exhibits a typically patronizing erotics when he observes that crowds are both excitable and uncannily skilled at the kind of mimicry "particularly well displayed by the children of some savage races (especially perhaps of the negro race), whom a kind of nihilism and aesthetics, there are echoes of the long tradition of existentialist resistance" (M, p. 193).
12. Gustave Le Bon, The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind, trans. pub. (1895; Mineola, N.Y., 2002), p. 6; hereafter abbreviated C.
13. To be precise, crowd stupidity was, for Le Bon, a structural outcome of the crowd formation rather than a distillation of the inherent mental inferiority of its members. To wit: "a gathering of scientific men or of artists, owing to the mere fact that they form an assemblage, will not deliver judgments on general subjects sensibly different from those rendered by a gathering of masons or grocers (C, p. 108).
it renders wonderfully attractive."
14 And Sigmund Freud aligned the "unmeasured intensification of every emotion" so typical of crowds with "the affective life of children" as well as with "dream life." 15 As in Le Bon, Freud's crowds perennially contained the danger of atavistic eruptions: "Just as primitive man survives potentially in every individual, so the primal horde may arise once more out of any random collection" (GP, p. 70).
From today's vantage point, it is as if the classic crowd writings sit on the losing side of history. They come across as the rear-guard manifestos of the antidemocratic counterinsurgency, the philosophical legitimation of crowd control. Intellectual historians palpate crowds for what they may reveal about the contested emergence of the mass society from the late eighteenth to the mid-twentieth centuries. But the idea that crowd theory may have something to contribute to current critical theory remains a kind of absurdity-most obviously because of the patently reactionary tone in which it tends to be written. Crowd theory is, quite simply, politically incorrect. Stefan Jonsson, for instance, caps his fine reflections on the historical transformations of the figure of the crowd in eighteenth-and nineteenthcentury France with the conclusion that "once the rhetorical cover is stripped off, [the discourse on crowds] typically comes down to an assertion of the bare fact of exclusion" and, further, that "with the theory of mass psychology, all grounds for defending collective action were cut away from mainstream cultural and political vocabulary."
16 Is this not a fair conclusion? Was crowd theory not all about explaining why the masses were unfit to govern themselves?
The answer to these questions is yes-insofar as our yardstick for the politically mature citizen remains the Kantian enlightened subject: "Enlightenment is man's release from his self-incurred tutelage. Tutelage is man's inability to make use of his understanding without direction from another. . . . Sapere aude! 'Have courage to use your own reason!'-that is the motto of enlightenment."
17 This seems to be the model McDougall has in mind when he describes the mature citizen as "a wide-awake, self-reliant man of settled convictions, possessing a large store of systematically organised knowledge which he habitually brings to bear in criticism of all statements made to him" (SP, p. 101). McDougall's "wide-awake, self-reliant man" is, in turn, an avatar of what Klaus Theweleit, indicting the murderous affinity between such armored subjectivity and genocidal violence, much later calls the "'upstanding' individual"-the subject who, through the most strenuous effort, manages to inure himself against the turmoil of his own so-called lower drives, who adopts an attitude of "sexual defense and mastery" and who is thus able to double as "the subject of scientific knowledge."
18 The persistent themes of effort and vigilance are important here. Kant's autonomous subject is already a paranoid subject-constantly scrutinizing itself for evidence of the seductions of heteronomy, maintaining a steadfast integrity against the sensuous temptation to merge.
Hegel, in the Phenomenology of Spirit, states quite explicitly that the condition of progress toward the autonomy of reason is a willingness to let the naively concrete attachments of "picture-thinking" be penetrated and surpassed (sublated) by the strain of conceptual thought.
19 And it is precisely a slide back into the chaos of picture-thinking that defines the crowd. Le Bon says: "A crowd thinks in images, and the image itself immediately calls up a series of other images, having no logical connection with the first" (C, p. 15). In a crowd, such illogical sequences of image association can easily give rise to "collective hallucinations," a kind of "crystallization which invades the understanding and paralyzes all critical faculty" (C, pp. 16, 18). Thus far, such collective picture-thinking would seem to be of interest to crowd theory only by virtue of what it lacks: the steady rudder of reason. But it is also worth noting that, within this discourse, thinking in pictures also means thinking with the body, imagined as an entity distinct from the rational faculties of the mind. Le Bon remarks that crowds act "far more under the influence of the spinal cord than of the brain" (C, p. 11). And, later, José Ortega y Gasset insists that "the mass-man has no attention to spare for reasoning, he learns only in his own flesh." 20 Importantly, the relation between reason and flesh is in the first instance imagined in zero-sum terms; the more there is of one, the less there is of the other. One cannot be both fully fleshy and truly reasonablehence the tremendous pressure of maintaining oneself as an "upstanding individual" and the concomitant temptation to let go for a few moments by merging with a crowd. By participation in the mental life of a crowd, one's emotions are stirred to a pitch that they seldom or never attain under other conditions. This is for most men an intensely pleasurable experience; they are, as they say, carried out of themselves, they feel themselves caught up in a great wave of emotion, and cease to be aware of their individuality and all its limitations; that isolation of the individual, which oppresses every one of us, though it may not be explicitly formulated in his consciousness, is for the time being abolished.
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Elias Canetti, writing from the other side of the Holocaust, also recognizes something sensuously therapeutic in the longing to surrender: "It is only in a crowd that man can become free of [his] fear of being touched. That is the only situation in which the fear changes into its opposite. The crowd he needs is the dense crowd, in which body is pressed to body; a crowd, too, whose psychical constitution is also dense, or compact, so that he no longer notices who it is that presses against him."
22 But the sense of selfless merger evaporates as soon as the crowd disperses; and its members, one may conjecture, must resume, in the glaring light of a bad crowd hangover, the strenuous work of armoring themselves.
Like all sensuous seductions, the call of the crowd is not simply what it appears to be-an invitation to lose oneself for a few moments-but also more profoundly treacherous because it lowers the defenses against heteronomous authority that otherwise keep tyrants at bay. Le Bon: "As soon as a certain number of living beings are gathered together, whether they be animals or men, they place themselves instinctively under the authority of a chief" (C, p. 72). The power of the chief is not inherent; rather, it derives from his ability to serve as what McDougall calls "a common object of mental activity" and to enable "a common mode of feeling in regard to it" (GM, p. 33). Elias Canetti states quite directly that a crowd's desperate desire for a shared focus-whether in the form of a physical leader or a rallying idea-stems from a constant collective anxiety about its own disintegration (see GM, p. 29).
We are, of course, creeping up on Freud's melancholy diagnosis of the pathology of civilization here. On the one hand, letting go and merging with a crowd represents a lamentable loss of autonomy, a betrayal of the crowd and together orienting toward an external authority can also be read as a general illustration of the principle that the sine qua non of civilized social life is a collective submission to a transcendent law. In his Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego (the Massenpsychologie of the original German title is more apt), Freud argues that the bonds between the members of a crowd as well as the bonds between each member and the leader are a mass extension of the Oedipal relation. The leader is a common object of libidinal investment and identification and thus makes possible harmonious and egalitarian relations between crowd members. By collectively submitting to a leader, crowd members sublimate their volatile and selfish instincts into "emotional ties. . . . Those sexual instincts which are inhibited in their aims have a great functional advantage over those which are uninhibited. Since they are not capable of really complete satisfaction, they are especially adapted to create permanent ties" (GP, pp. 31, 91). 23 We have moved, then, from crowds as sudden and temporary surges that threaten the social fabric toward a theory in which the social fabric itself is a kind of institutionalized crowd. This is significant not only in the way that is usually supposed-that is, that civilization is based on repression 24 -but also because it begins to suggest that the opposition between picture-thinking and reason, between sensuous merger and social structure, is not as rigid as it might seem from a cursory reading of the crowd theorists. McDougall already senses the paradox. How can it be, he asks in his Group Mind, that "participation in group life degrades the individual, assimilating his mental processes to those of the crowd, whose brutality, inconstancy, and unreasoning impulsiveness have been the theme of many writers; yet only by participation in group life does man become fully man, only so does he rise above the level of the savage"? (GM, pp. 27-28). This is a question that I will explore at greater length below. For now, I want to dwell for a moment on how the dominant tendency to interpret the desire 23 . See the "Primal Band" section of Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen's The Freudian Subject for a masterful and devastating deconstruction of the Oedipal logic of Freud's crowd theory. Whereas crowd theorists from Le Bon to Canetti emphasize the crowd's desperate fear of being left leaderless, Borch-Jacobsen reads the insistence on a leader-cathexis as a desperate strategy, on the part of crowd psychologists, to rescue the primacy of the self-grounding, autonomously desiring subject who can choose to submit to a law, even as everything about crowd dynamics would seem to undermine it. The most horrifying prospect from the standpoint of psychoanalysis, he argues, would be "the absence of anyone to want or desire anything at allexcept the strange and disquieting suggect of hypnosis, always already in submission, subjected to the will of another" (Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen, for merger with crowds as regressive supports a cynical form of political reason.
The convenient political paradox of crowds so dangerously susceptible to leaders is that, in order to be saved from themselves, they have to be led. In a mode of philosophical idealism crowd theorists routinely lament how quickly apparently rational individuals are prepared, as it were, to run off with the circus-to surrender their hard-won autonomy to passing crowd enthusiasms. But as political realists they simultaneously insist that, as members of crowds, such irresponsible and immature individuals do not deserve all the privileges of mature citizenship. As Ernesto Laclau observes, the self-governing autonomy that the crowd theorists appeal to in individuals cannot be granted to crowds.
25 Crowd theory effectively short-circuits the radical implications of group energy and abruptly proclaims both the necessity of leaders and the requirement that crowds love their leaders. As Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen points out: "Love, here, is immediately a political economy."
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It is by the same token also an economy of mass affect, and crowd theory is very much a commentary on the emergence of public opinion in an age of mass democracy. In the late nineteenth century, a tabloid public sphere emerged out of the conjuncture of a vastly expanded franchise and the consolidation of advertising-supported mass media. Responding to these developments, crowd theorists lament the displacement of reasoned public opinion by a public whose only claim to authority is brutely numerical. Le Bon winces as "popes, kings and emperors consent to be interviewed as a means of submitting their views on a given subject to the judgment of crowds" (C, p. 96). Not only are crowds now illegitimately assuming the dignity of publics; their half-baked opinions, having gained the authority of public circulation, are suddenly also in a position to influence elites and intelligentsias who, under any other circumstances, would not for a moment entertain such nonsense. 27 In the age of mass publicity everyone unduly influences everyone else; opportunistic orators sway crowds and The beliefs of the crowd always have their origin to a greater or lesser extent in some higher idea, which has often remained without influence in the sphere in which it was evolved. Leaders and agitators, subjugated by this higher idea, take hold of it, distort it and create a sect which distorts it afresh, and then propagates it amongst the masses, who carry the process of deformation still further. Become a popular truth the idea returns, as it were, to its source and exerts an influence on the upper classes of a nation. [C, p. 80] the better folk are forced to submit to common prejudice masquerading as public opinion. From this diagnosis the road to antidemocratic (or at least antipopulist) prescription is short. In such a topsy-turvy world the only hope is for the crowd to give up its unearned claim to sovereignty and to "submit its life to a higher court, formed of the superior minorities" (RM, p. 127).
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This, then, would appear to be the dismal contribution of crowd theory: to have pathologized the vital energies of human groups so thoroughly that they can only appear as symptoms of modern savagery and, as such, wholly at odds with any prospect of human progress. Who's afraid of the crowd? begins to look very much like a rhetorical question.
Multitudes: Plural Singularities
The apparent malignancy of crowd theory produces, broadly speaking, two kinds of responses. The first is liberal-democratic and rejects the crowd theorists' elitist scorn for the political prospects of the masses. It holds onto the hope that autonomous enlightened citizens can be nurtured in the bosom of reasonable civic assemblies. It is ultimately a theory of subjectivity and representation. The second response is democratic in what one might call a postliberal way. That is to say, it continues to stress the importance of autonomy (against the crowd as a figure of slavish heteronomy), but it locates this autonomy not in self-determining liberal subjects but rather in the emergent integrity of collectivities. It is ultimately a theory of collectivity and immanence. I take Hardt and Negri's writings on multitudes as exemplary of this second tendency.
Multitudes potentiate collectivity. Unlike crowds, they do so while preserving, even developing, the singularity of each of their constituent elements. The internal logic of multitudes rebels against the tyranny of any externally imposed form. Multitudes are at once "plural singularities" and "common singularities"-difference with collectivity (M, pp. 99, 159). This is possible because multitudes obey only their own emergent law. Multitudes remain true to their own becoming because they refuse mediation through anything outside themselves. Their power is "constituent" (internal, immanent) rather than "representative" (external, mediated). Writing for an age of global mass sovereignty, Hardt and Negri describe 28. Ortega y Gasset did not conceive these "superior minorities" as a hereditary nobility or a ruling class in the ascribed sense. Rather, these were "excellent" individuals who-much like Nietzsche's superman-refused the inertia of ordinary comforts in favor of a disciplined, striving submission to a higher ideal. This commitment would give them the wisdom and imagination to seize hold of and form the underlying "concrete vital reality" that the masses manifested in crude form (RM, p. 169).
the self-producing autonomy of multitudes in terms reminiscent of those that their seventeenth-century inspiration Baruch Spinoza once reserved for divinity: "God acts from the laws of his nature alone, and is compelled by no one."
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And yet the multitude's immaculate autonomy is also historically grounded. Since Hardt and Negri understand themselves as updating the revolutionary vision of Marx and Engels, their multitudes likewise seek to bring the Spirit of German romanticism down to earth, to ground its flowering in the concrete work we all do-we "proletarians," we "'poors.'" 30 As historical materialism, multitude theory leans toward the carnally vital. Our collective productive substance, what Hardt and Negri call "the flesh of the multitude," is infinitely generative and polymorphously resistant to external management. If the crowd oscillates between horror and tragedy, the multitude is sublime:
The flesh of the multitude is pure potential, an unformed life force, and in this sense an element of social being, aimed constantly at the fullness of life. From this ontological perspective, the flesh of the multitude is an elemental power that continuously expands social being, producing in excess of every traditional political-economic measure of value. You can try to harness the wind, the sea, the earth, but each will always exceed your grasp. From the perspective of political order and control, then, the elemental flesh of the multitude is maddeningly elusive, since it cannot be entirely corralled into the hierarchical organs of a political body. [M, p. 192] Out of this mobile, resilient flesh, multitudes may yet collectively fashion their own "new social body" (E, p. 204). This is now possible partly because work worldwide increasingly involves what Hardt and Negri call immaterial labor.
31 This terrain of labor is where the emergent creativity of work-29. Baruch Spinoza, Ethics, trans. and ed. Edwin Curley (1677; Harmondsworth, 1996), p. 13.
30. Hardt and Negri use these terms quite strategically. In the face of worldwide Empire, we may all claim membership.
31. Hardt and Negri are not arguing that we have now moved into an information economy or a knowledge society in which the materialities of work have become unimportant. The process of work itself remains for them highly material; it is rather a matter of an increasing orientation toward immaterial products that they are indicating. Nor is immaterial labor necessarily highly remunerated or regarded; it includes both the kind of affective labor that low-end service personnel are supposed to perform and the high-end intellectual work that we conventionally associated with terms like "knowledge society." Finally, Hardt and Negri are not arguing that older kinds of work-such as agriculture-have now been displaced by immaterial labor. Rather they are suggesting, on the one hand, that immaterial labor has become a kind of hegemonic standard by which other forms of work are increasingly evaluated ing multitudes meets the cutting edge of capital-and exceeds it. The basic argument here is that the more the very work of the collective imagination itself is commodified, the more capitalism produces the tools of its own transcendence. This part of Hardt and Negri's story sounds (dare I say it?) dialectical in an orthodox sense; the immaculate autonomy of the multitude is fully realized-in a massive world-historical sublation-at the precise point where capital has so entirely subsumed immaterial labor that it can no longer exploit it without, as it were, exploiting itself. Thus we would have, in strict Hegelian terms, the negation of the negation through which the multitude would rise out of the ashes of global capitalism. And thus we reach the moment of immediacy to end all mediations, as described in Empire: "at this point in development class struggle acts without limit on the organization of power. Having achieved the global level, capitalist development is faced directly with the multitude, without mediation" (E, pp. 236 -37).
Multitudes, having thus had their very flesh and brains penetrated by the commodity form, find that their immaterial labor also cannot help but produce what Hardt and Negri call "the common," a collective revolutionary substance made by the "common productive flesh of the multitude" (M, p. 189). This "common" expresses the activated potentialities of quotidian materials-vernaculars, habits, dreams. "Subjectivity . . . is produced through cooperation and communication and, in turn, this produced subjectivity itself produces new forms of cooperation and communication, which in turn produce new subjectivity, and so forth." Thus the new social body of multitudes may yet make an "alternative to the global political body of capital" (M, p. 189).
At first sight, one might think that to speak of multitudes means to rehabilitate crowds for a "progressive" critical theory. If the crowd theorists pathologize the immanent potentials of groups as savage and irrational, then multitude theory recognizes that these energies are not external to the social order and, further, that precisely because they are not external to it they are also potentially revolutionary. Drawing on the American pragmatists, Hardt and Negri suggest that what multitudes express and proand, on the other, that precisely the older kinds of work like agriculture that we habitually oppose to "knowledge work" should themselves perhaps be reinterpreted as forms of immaterial labor. As Slavoj Ž ižek, has put it, "today, immaterial labor is 'hegemonic' in the precise sense in which Marx proclaimed that, in nineteenth-century capitalism, large industrial production is hegemonic as the specific color giving its tone to the totality-not quantitatively, but playing the key, emblematic structural role" (Slavoj Ž ižek, The Parallax View [Cambridge, Mass., 2006], p. 262).
duce, first of all, is habit: "Habit is the common in practice. . . . Habits create a nature that serves as the basis of life." Habits feel as natural as physical functions, but they are social: "Habits constitute our social nature" (M, p. 197). This social nature is the constitutive basis for producing in common, for common interests, and therefore for changing the world as we transform each other.
Unexpectedly, none other than Le Bon gives us an example of the potentialities of the common in practice. Having insisted on the stupidity of crowds, he nevertheless proceeds to credit them with a kind of deep social truth. The surface volatility of a crowd is "like the leaves which a tempest whirls up and scatters in every direction and then allows to fall." But such superficial agitations conceal far deeper currents that are at once more perduring and more mysterious: "visible social phenomena appear to be the result of an immense, unconscious working, that as a rule is beyond the reach of our analysis. Perceptible phenomena may be compared to the waves, which are the expression on the surface of the ocean of deep-lying disturbances of which we know nothing." However hot-headed and ill-advised crowd action may be, it ultimately expresses, for Le Bon, "the unconscious aspirations and needs of the race." Race here is primarily a category of social rather than biological heredity. It indexes a collective "unconscious substratum" that has been accumulated and sedimented over long periods of time: "this substratum consists of the innumerable common characteristics handed down from generation to generation, which constitute the genius of a race" (C, pp. 12, v, 122, 5).
This grounding in the timeless wellsprings of collective sentiment and practice helps crowds, Le Bon allows, to stand firm against the depredations of tyrants as well as to reject the routinized deracination of bureaucratic domination: that "oppressive despotism" of an "administrative caste" that combines, in a uniquely toxic admixture, "irresponsibility, impersonality and perpetuity" (C, p. 136). But Le Bon's crowd is not only an idiotically inert bulwark. Rather, not unlike Hardt and Negri's later multitudes, it is capable of a distributed, impersonal creativity of awe-inspiring dimensions. As Le Bon puts it: "What, for instance, can be more complicated, more logical, more marvellous than a language? Yet whence can this admirably organised production have arisen, except it be the outcome of the unconscious genius of crowds?" (C, p. v).
And yet Hardt and Negri painstakingly insist that we must on no account confuse the work of multitudes with that of crowds. Like multitudes, they allow, crowds may certainly be internally differentiated. But this differentiation remains "inert," void of any vital spark. In crowds, individuals and groups are "incoherent and recognize no common shared elements." And when it comes to masses, "all differences are submerged and drowned. . . . All the colours of the population fade to grey" (M, pp. 100, xiv). It is as if whatever difference crowds may contain cannot become a principle of potentiality or of creative emergence. Hardt observes that the distinction between multitudes and their more inert predecessors "has to do with the passivity of the crowd, masses, and mob, which is closely related to their indifference."
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To what extent is the autonomy of multitudes predicated on conscious agency? Le Bon, after all, writes of the "unconscious genius of crowds," adding "this very unconsciousness is perhaps one of the secrets of their strength" (C, p. vi). Although habit, as "the common in practice," must also be largely unconscious, Hardt will not grant crowds the kind of autonomous agency of which multitudes are capable: "the mob, of course, along with the crowd and the masses, can do things, sometimes horrible things, but it is nonetheless fundamentally passive in the sense that it needs to be led and cannot act of its own accord, autonomously."
33 Because of this-their fundamental passivity-crowds are, for Hardt, doomed to heteronomy.
How are we to understand the autonomy that multitudes enjoy but crowds do not? What should we make of the suggestion that multitudes are at once immaculately self-constituting and conditioned by capital? Can multitudes be immediate and mediated at the same time? And, if they can, does the figure of the crowd, index of hopeless heteronomy, somehow secretly mediate this contradiction? Might we even say that multitude theory actually needs the crowd as its own abjected element? In other words, is the figure of the crowd the thing that multitude theory must banish again and again in order to displace its own internal contradiction onto an artificial external opposition between multitudes and crowds?
Multitudes: Order against Desire Multitudes, it would appear, are at once inside and outside of capital. On the one hand, Hardt and Negri wax Jamesonian and insist: "there is no longer an outside to capital" (M, p. 102). "Communication"-which in Empire seems to mean approximately the same thing as immaterial labor does in Multitude-"is the form of capitalist production in which capital has succeeded in submitting society entirely and globally to its regime, suppressing all alternative paths" (E, p. 347). On the other hand, Hardt and Negri also insist that capital is never in a position completely to constrain 32. Hardt, "Bathing in the Multitude," in Crowds, p. 39. 33. Ibid., p. 39. the flesh of the multitude. This flesh remains "always excessive with respect to the value that capital can extract from it because capital can never capture all of life" (M, p. 145). While there is no outside to capital, then, this no outside is clearly a relative matter because making the common always means making "a surplus that cannot be expropriated by capital or captured in the regimentation of the global political body" (M, p. 212).
To say that there is no outside to capital and that labor always produces a surplus that capital cannot capture is, to be sure, not necessarily a contradiction. One could imagine this surplus as being within capital while still being extraneous to-and even refractive of-its requirements. The surplus or excess that refuses to be subsumed by capital could be imagined as a potentially revolutionary reservoir. But it could also be seen, in a more Ž ižekian fashion, not as an original property of the multitude that refuses to be appropriated but rather as a surplus produced through the very mechanism of commodification-in other words, an excess that is not prior to capital but rather an outcome of its movement. Patricia Clough's gloss on Negri approaches such a position when she suggests that under conditions of immaterial production "capital produces its own outside from inside the viscera of life, accumulating at the level of preindividual bodily capacities and putting preindividual bodily capacities to work."
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For their part, Hardt and Negri maintain that "when the flesh of the multitude is imprisoned and transformed into the body of global capital, it finds itself both within and against the processes of capitalist globalization" (M, p. 101).
But in fact Hardt and Negri seem unwilling to sustain this analytical tension. Instead, the dynamic unity of its terms collapses into an opposition between two worlds that jostle for space within their discourse. In one, multitudes are profoundly mediated by capital and found their struggles on this basis. Here, capital and multitude are intimately enmeshed, each the condition of the other's reproduction. From within this world, Hardt and Negri write, plausibly enough, that "if ever an alternative is to be proposed, it will have to arise from within the society of the real subsumption and demonstrate all the contradictions at the heart of it" (E, p. 347). This is the world that Hardt and Negri are inhabiting when they insist that "we should be done once and for all with the search for an outside, a standpoint that imagines a purity for our politics" (E, p. 46). One could imagine a concrete analysis starting from these principles, one that would be especially attentive to those locations in which making the common produces a surplus that haunts the commodity form-perhaps productively, perhaps seductively-as a kind of extimate element at the heart of capital.
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And, yet, the desire of Hardt and Negri's text pushes away from this possibility and toward, precisely, "a purity for our politics"-a purity that is imagined as an absence of mediation. The most central motif in the story that Hardt and Negri tell about modernity is the betrayal of vital energy by mediation. Multitudes, in all their vital autonomy, represent the immediate recuperation of life. Crowds, in their passive heteronomy, represent the thoroughly mediated, and thus lifeless, collective. If multitudes and crowds are on one level both about the emergent potentials of groups, then it is now also becoming clearer why crowds cannot be admitted into the same space as multitudes. Crowds are all about the mediation of vital energies, and, for Hardt and Negri, mediation ultimately means death. The coming of multitudes, conversely, signals the overcoming of a modern philosophical tradition based on the morbidity of abstraction. This is how Hardt and Negri describe the moment when life was lost-when (to paraphrase Guy Debord) everything that was once directly lived moved away into a representation:
The triad vis-cupiditas-amor (strength-desire-love) which constituted the productive matrix of the revolutionary thought of humanism was opposed by a triad of specific mediations. Nature and experience are unrecognizable except through the filter of phenomena; human knowledge cannot be achieved except through the reflection of the intellect; and the ethical world is incommunicable except through the schematism of reason. What is at play is a form of mediation, or really a reflexive folding back and a sort of weak transcendence, which relativizes experience and abolishes every instance of the immediate and absolute in human life and history. [E, pp. 78 -79] It is not as if Hardt and Negri are unaware of the problems that arise from a way of thinking that is always positing immediate potential against mediated order. In Empire, they profess to be looking for a way to apprehend "the production of the social" that would build on Deleuze and Guattari's foregrounding of the productive potential of desire without falling prey to their tendency to valorize only "continuous movement and absolute flows." Hardt and Negri acknowledge that "the affirmation of hybridities 35 . Extimate is a term from the Lacanian lexicon that juxtaposes the external with the intimate to suggest the paradoxical manner in which something alien resides at the heart of the most intimate structures of the subject. and the free play of differences across boundaries . . . is liberatory only in a context where power poses hierarchy exclusively through essential identities, binary divisions, and stable propositions." And indeed their own analytic of power moves far beyond such rigidities. For that reason, it seems all the more curious that they nevertheless continue to fall back on the idea that modernity-which we presumably still inhabit-pits "order against desire" and is defined by "a crisis that is born of the uninterrupted conflict between the immanent, constructive, creative forces and the transcendent power aimed at restoring order" (E, pp. 28, 142, 74, 76).
We have by now moved far away from the proposition that multitude is at once inside and outside capital and that, consequently, the place where the common is made is an extimate one. Instead, we have fallen back on an all-too-familiar zero-sum opposition between potentiality and domination, between emergence and mediation. Despite themselves, Hardt and Negri's desire for political purity leaves them actually unable or unwilling to theorize the extimate relation of the multitude vis-à-vis capital. In its place, they put a simple binary contrast between the plenitude of multitudes and the pin-drop emptiness of constituted power, that is, between life and death: "With respect to the virtuality of the multitude . . . imperial government appears as an empty shell or a parasite" (E, p. 359).
But perhaps I am missing the point? Maybe multitude theory is actually more performative than analytical? Perhaps it is meant to be something like what Georges Sorel, that fellow follower of Henri Bergson, calls a "revolutionary myth"? For Sorel, such a myth was above all a focus of heroic commitment, an inoculation against adversity: "revolutionary myths . . . are not descriptions of things but expressions of a will to act." In our disenchanted modernity, with its "gentle, sceptical and, above all, pacific habits," such myths are precious because they fire the moral courage of world-historical action.
36 Echoing Bergson's distinction between integral-intuitive and analytic-conceptual knowing, 37 Sorel argues that pedantic "intellectualist" critiques of such myths are at best misguided, at worst corrosive: "we should not attempt to analyse such groups of images in the way that we break down a thing into its elements." Rather, mythimages should be inhabited in a register of commitment and hope. They "should be taken as a whole, as historical forces" ("I," pp. 21, 20). Perhaps one might say, then, that the myth of the multitude given us by Hardt and Negri is in this sense a sublime object; it is redolent of that "torment of the infinite" that Sorel identifies with "all that is best in the modern mind" ("I," p. 24). 38 But the problem with the myth of the multitude is that it is ultimately an exhortatory rather than an analytical device. Its relation to the figure of the crowd is, however, more complex than mere opposition. The vigor with which crowds are refused from within the discourse of the multitude suggests a more ambivalent entanglement.
Earlier, I remarked on the anachronistic guise into which crowds have been forced in current social analysis. We are now in a position to see that if crowds are allochronic vis-à-vis the discourse of the present, then they are perhaps also, in the Nietzschean sense, untimely. That is to say, their apparent anachronism is actually a coded sign of their relevance to the present. This becomes clearer once we stop using the figure of crowds as an obscene limit against which to shore up liberal and postliberal narratives of democratic agency. This limit-version of the crowd is, as Le Bon's remarks on language as an emergent crowd phenomenon already begins to suggest, a lamentable simplification. By embarking on a more nuanced reading of the crowd literature, then, I am not merely trying to restore some of its rightful complexity. More to the point, I am suggesting that a more complex reading demonstrates that crowd theory may yet contain a way of taking up the challenge that multitude theory lays down (how to theorize the work of the common within the structures of capital) but that multitude theory itself is unable to resolve because of the rush-to-myth that is its performative desire.
Certainly, my deconstruction of Hardt and Negri's take on the multitude has allowed me, in a polemical way, to call into question a social analysis based on the fantasy of what Carl Schmitt celebrated as "unmediated immanent life."
39 But the question of the multitude also thus begs the question of how one might actually find a way to talk about the emergent potentials of group energy that is at the same time a theory of social me-38. That such romantic-intuitionist refusals of analytical critique appeal as much to the authoritarian as to the anarchist imagination is borne out by Carl Schmitt's ready embrace of Sorel's argument at the conclusion of The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy, trans. Ellen Kennedy (1923; Cambridge, Mass., 1988). In his impatient desire to sweep away the effete mediations of parliamentary politics, Schmitt seizes upon Sorel's account of the vital immediacy of the proletarian multitude, which forms its revolutionary myth out of "the depths of a genuine life instinct," a "great enthusiasm," and a "direct intuition" (p. 68). Against this "true impulse of an intensive life" is ranged "the cowardly intellectualism" of the bourgeois world with its life-sapping "academic construction[s]" (pp. 70, 69, 71). My point here is not to suggest that there is no difference between Hardt and Negri's anarcho-democratic multitude and Carl Schmitt's fascist demos. At the same time, I also think it is insufficient to say that the multitude's vitally productive energies continue to point toward freedom because it refuses the externally imposed disciplines of a Führer or of bureaucratic governmentality.
39. Ibid., p. 67.
diation-in other words, a theory that would not pit "order against desire" but would rather be able to track their dialectical coconstitution.
Mimesis: A Perverse Detour
Given all of crowd theory's sneering, is not my desire to redeem it perverse? Certainly it is-if one uses the term in its strict sense: a relation that proceeds by way of (per via) a detour. And perhaps this given detour, multitude theory, is especially perverse, given that the multitude so clearly wants no part of the crowd. But perhaps the multitude can only realize itself as a theoretical category by undergoing a little aversion therapy. So, what is the crowd's most repellent feature? Its inert heteronomy. What is the sign of this inert heteronomy? From a liberal point of view, the collapse of the upstanding individual; from a postliberal point of view, the subsumption of singularity. What causes both of these outcomes? The mimetic contagion of crowds.
This mimetic contagion is at once the most central and the most ambiguous theme in the crowd literature. It goes by many names. Le Bon declares that "in a crowd, every sentiment and act is contagious" and classes this contagion among "phenomena of a hypnotic order" while conceding that it is "not easy to explain" (C, p. 7). For McDougall, the "reciprocal influence" (GM, p. 23) seen in crowds is a large-scale intensification of a "primitive form of sympathy," a "pseudo-instinct" that he compares to the more cognitive "suggestion" and the more physically mimetic "imitation" (SP, pp. 93, 95). Stressing the literal derivation of sympathy, McDougall (in line with the classic discussions of Adam Smith and David Hume) chooses to understand it as a kind of universally present empathetic reflex: a "suffering with, the experiencing of any feeling or emotion when and because we observe in other persons or creatures the expression of that feeling or emotion." Amplified in a group, such mutual permeability can lead to "the wild excesses of which crowds are so often guilty" (SP, pp. 95, 107).
A sudden external trigger, a dramatic event, is typically understood to cause "that turning" of the "feelings and thoughts of the collectivity in an identical direction" (C, p. 4). "Let a fire-engine come galloping through the throng of traffic, or the Lord Mayor's stage coach arrive, and instantly the concourse assumes in some degree the character of a psychological crowd" with "a common mode of feeling in regard to [the external object], and some degree of reciprocal influence between the members of the group" (GM, p. 33). Superficially this reciprocal influence is all about homogenization. Participants in a crowd are beside themselves not only in an ecstatic sense but also quite literally in that a crowd seems to tune everyone into the same frequency. Crowd contagion stereotypically comes down to simple duplication. In a crowd I feel what you feel; mirroring each other we amplify the sentiment to infinity and pass it on to those around us until the crowd is a single buzzing block of unified affect. This is where crowds look most distant from multitudes; rather than building on this reciprocal influence to become autonomous, to make something in common, the energy of crowds can only be harnessed by an external authority who commands the masses by virtue of their prestige.
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Le Bon defines prestige as "a sort of domination exercised on our mind by an individual, a work, or an idea." Just like what happens when picturethinking takes over from reason, "this domination entirely paralyses our critical faculty, and fills our soul with astonishment and respect. . . . Prestige is the mainspring of all authority" (C, p. 81). McDougall places prestige within the more general category of suggestion, "a process of communication resulting in the acceptance with conviction of the communicated proposition in the absence of logically adequate grounds for its acceptance." "Prestige suggestion" is the kind of intellectual submission to which one succumbs "in the presence of persons who make upon us an impression of power or of superiority of any kind, whether merely of size or physical strength, or of social standing, or of intellectual reputation, or, perhaps, even of tailoring" (SP, pp. 100, 102).
But this is also where we encounter an important ambiguity. One minute we are told that mimetic transmission within crowds works by mechanical duplication, involving neither imagination nor judgment. Le Bon writes: "certain transitory images are attached to certain words: the word is merely as it were the button of an electric bell that calls them up" (C, p. 62). Members of crowds understood thus are like Fichte's "person without Geist [who] obtains his rules from without; he is able to do nothing but copy."
41 And yet in the next moment, as we have seen, crowd communication is credited with the capacity to produce the most fantastical and unpredictable concatenations of images (Le Bon's "the image itself immediately calls up a series of other images, having no logical connection with the first"). Unlike the measured, autonomous self-making of multitudes, crowd transmission would seem to be both slavishly heteronomous and anarchically unruly.
40. Borch-Jacobsen notes that one of the founding acts of mature psychoanalysis was to distance itself from hypnosis and suggestion in the name of securing the analysand's autonomy as a self-speaking subject, thus also securing the ethical integrity of the analytic relationship as seen from a liberal-bourgeois standpoint. See Borch-Jacobsen, The Freudian Subject. I suggested above that multitude theory à la Hardt and Negri runs up against an impasse when its desire to hold on to an image of unmediated becoming prevents it from properly theorizing the problem of what kinds of social mediations the production of the common inside/outside capital might entail. Now we are in a position to recognize the corresponding impasse in crowd theory. The crowd theorists' overriding desire to categorize crowds as sociopathic prevents them from fully addressing a central implication of their own discourse, namely, that the mimetic transmission that works by picture-thinking and that results in submission to prestige is also the means by which social institutions and even the much-fetishized upstanding individual become possible. As Alexandre Kojève once wrote: "Man can appear on earth only within a herd."
42 Is it possible that the scorn that multitude talk heaps on crowds has something to do not with superficial incompatibilities of political orientation but rather with a deeper, inadmissible intimacy between their respective impasses? To begin to answer that question we will need to probe a bit further into the ambiguous status of mimesis in crowd theory.
The question at issue first of all, then, is whether-within the crowd literature-the principle of reciprocal influence (or mimetic contagion, or prestige-suggestion, or what have you) is at any point imagined as a productive capacity rather than simply a way of becoming collectively stupid. We have already encountered a hint that this might be the case with Le Bon's ruminations on the origins of language. But, for Le Bon, the "unconscious genius" that produces language operates, as it were, entirely behind the backs of individuals. Likewise, we have seen that the crowd effect is often likened to an earlier developmental stage, whether of the individual or the species. Herbert Spencer, herald of nineteenth-century social evolutionism, identifies imitation as the foundation of primitive learning. And, as Laclau notes, the significance of suggestion is a crucial bone of contention in the late-nineteenth-century clinical psychology that informed the classic crowd writings; for Jean-Martin Charcot at Salpêtrière, suggestion is inseparable from pathology, whereas for Jean Liébault and Hippolyte Bernheim at Nancy it is a central component of normal everyday functioning.
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Developmental thinking-again, whether at the level of the individual or of the species-tends to imply that early subject-formation depends on a mimetic openness to one's surroundings but that at a certain point one must take the step into maturity and become autonomous, self-directing, and skeptical in relation to the claims and influence of others. As the psychologist F. C. Bartlett observes, if education does what it should, then the early age of dependence ("tutelage" in Kant's lexicon) "will pass easily and in an orderly manner. It is like the props and supports which the infant uses as he is learning to walk; but then, when his muscles have grown firmer and the nervous tissues and their connexions are ready, he discards his props and goes firmly by himself where he pleases." 44 To the upstanding individual who has decisively discarded his props the pull of the crowd can only seem atavistic. To a writer like Le Bon, crowds represent the mass failure of citizenly maturation and thus also a betrayal of the ideal of a rational mass public.
At the same time, no sooner has this linear developmental ideal been articulated than it is called into question. In part this is a pragmatic response to the problem of how to manage public opinion in a society of crowds. Starting in the early twentieth century, and spurred on by World War I, the new sciences of public relations, propaganda, and mass marketing understand their problem specifically as the management of crowd cognition and mass affect (the quotation from Bartlett is in fact from his book on propaganda). This heightened attention to the management of public affect has the side effect of suggesting that the relation between mimetic suggestion and autonomous reason may not be a one-way street. Not only do we remain mimetic, but this capacity should not necessarily be seen only as a primitive survival in the upstanding individual.
For example, McDougall notes that "all of us, if our attention is keenly concentrated on the movements of another person, are apt to make, at least in a partial incipient fashion, every movement we observe." On one level, this makes us vulnerable to manipulation: "most adults . . . remain suggestible, especially towards mass-suggestion and towards the propositions which they know to be supported by the whole of society or by a long tradition." And yet McDougall also says that total immunity to mimesis is pathological; a person clinging to a state of "contra-suggestion" is little more than an isolated crank (SP, pp. 108, 103-4, 105).
Perhaps it is not surprising that it would take the historical experience of mass totalitarianism in the East and West to prepare the ground for Elias Canetti's magisterial reflection on Crowds and Power in which a fable of the specificity of human mimesis is yoked to a quasi-sociological model of its institutionalization (and thus also, in a sense, its betrayal). Humans, Canetti argues, share their mimetic ability with other animals. But, unlike the 44. F. C. Bartlett, Political Propaganda (Cambridge, 1940), p. 22.
others, humans imitate self-reflexively. Human imitation is thus, in a crucial sense, mediate in that it involves self-consciousness and self-distance as well as an exquisite, fully sensory attunement to the other. Canetti thus locates the kind of critical distance that is usually contrasted with mimetic merger right at the heart of human mimesis: "Monkeys and parrots imitate, but, as far as we know, they do not change within themselves in the process. One might say that they do not know what it is they are imitating; they have never experienced it from inside" (GM, p. 370). Situated at once within and without the mimetic act, human beings make it transformative and creative. Its particular enjoyment and immanent potential arises out of the interplay between sensuous reflex and conscious reflection: "In the enormously long period of time during which [man] lived in small groups, he, as it were, incorporated into himself, by transformations, all the animals he knew. It was through the development of transformation that he really became man; it was his specific gift and pleasure" (GM, p. 108). Canetti takes us a long way from classic crowd theory's zero-sum drama of mimesis versus reason; in his vision, mimesis is creative and liberatory because of, rather than in spite of, its natural conditioning.
Canetti points us toward a question of crucial importance when he begins to reflect on how the pleasurable gift of creative mimesis gets harnessed to enable durable social institutions. Classic crowd theory tends to assume that crowd energy is inimical to social order. And, ironically, later votaries of the multitude share this assumption, even though they reverse its moral polarity. Classic crowd theory largely demonizes the emergent energy of crowds; multitude theory valorizes it while distancing itself from the withering vocabulary of crowd writings. The point is that in both cases the opposition between group energy and social order is maintained. We have already seen how Hardt and Negri, particularly in their more Spinozist/autonomist moments, perpetuate the opposition. extrinsic power and intrinsic puissance which must rigorously guide our thinking."
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Things are, as we have seen, already rather subtler in Freud, where the internalization of external authority involved in sublimation and the perverse enjoyment generated by attempting to placate an insatiable superego blends "extrinsic power" and "intrinsic puissance" to a point of extimacy where it no longer makes much sense to inquire into the difference between them. To be sure, the Freudian model of social power is based on the idea of repression. But it also suggests that the division between "extrinsic" and "intrinsic" is itself a product of that same process of repression.
At first sight, Canetti's theory of how crowds form social institutions seems to be a story of affect management rather than one of repression. For him, social institutions-religions, nations, and so on down the scale-are not abstractions imposed on the vital energy of their adherents but rather mechanisms through which the creatively mimetic energy of groups can be harnessed and in that way realized while being regulated. Institutions do not for him so much stifle crowd energy as harness it within ritual forms that will preserve it at a moderate level, enough to maintain collective commitments but not enough to run wild: "The regularity of church-going and the precise and familiar repetition of certain rites safeguard for the crowd something like a domesticated experience of itself" (GM, p. 21). Such a "conscious slowing down of crowd events" helps to maintain crowd energy at an effective but safe pitch, a "defined density kept within moderate bounds . . . a mild state of crowd feeling sufficient to impress itself on [crowd members] without becoming dangerous, and to which they grow accustomed" (GM, pp. 41, 25).
Even in Canetti, though, the story is ultimately about the repression of "elemental attributes" (GM, p. 25). Domesticated crowds with their "mild state of crowd feeling" are in vital terms rather etiolated, sadly subject to the titrated ministrations of a cynical priesthood: "their feeling of unity is dispensed to them in doses" (GM, p. 25). Something like a fetish relation has opened up, it seems. Whereas the pleasurable gift of mimesis was once our creative birthright as human beings, and collectively activated in crowds, it has now been alienated to the point where it appears to reside in the institutional structure of the groups to which we pledge allegiance and before whose priests we surrender our autonomy. In the language of Deleuze and Guattari, what was once open and molecular has now become closed and molar. Although Canetti is too subtle to draw such a conclusion, the stereotypically "political" implication of such an analysis would seem to be the problem of how to reclaim the creative mimetic energy of crowds away from the power structures that tame and alienate it. Is there some way to escape the constant return, in both liberal and postliberal thinking, to the opposition between freedom and determination? Can we develop the properly dialectical kernel of Canetti's idea that mimesis can be reflectively creative without falling back on the heroisms of either the autonomous individual (as self-determining rational agent) or the autonomous collective (as immanent multitude)? While both these heroic scenarios carry all the romantic pathos of liberation, both also push us back toward an undialectical opposition between heteronomy and autonomy, order and desire. Stuck within that opposition we can speak of slavish crowds or autonomous multitudes. But we cannot grasp how mimesis drives the subtle dialectic between emergence (immanence) and institutionalization (mediation) that, I would suggest, is a fundamental principle of social life.
Mimesis: The Magnetizer
The most radical proponent of mimesis as a universal principle is Gabriel Tarde, whose (in)famous italicized formula runs as follows: "Society is imitation and imitation is a kind of somnambulism." 47 Long before the poststructuralist effacement of man-as-cogito, Tarde argues that the conscious, self-determining individual is a kind of fiction masking events taking place at a more impersonal level. He proposes that repetition gives rise to everything in the world, all the way from "vibration among inorganic bodies" through "heredity in organic life" to "self-spreading contagions" (LI, pp. 11, 17). According to Tarde, society began not on the first day of truck and barter but rather "when one man first copied another" (LI, p. 28). We may believe ourselves to be self-determining, autonomous agents. But as individuals, Tarde argues, we are merely the resonating nodes of a network, driven by "the contagion of imitation" where collisions, refractions and amplifications between circulating impulses take place (LI, p. 4n). 48 We may think that we deliberately bring new things into the world.
But Tarde insists that innovation generally arises in quite unpredictable, apparently accidental ways, when several imitation impulses collide and give rise to new "interference-combinations" (LI, p. 30). The measure of the social success of such new combinations is the extent to which they are widely imitated and thus diffused. In its own way, this is a rigorous theory of immanence and emergence. An innovation, argues Tarde, "actualizes one of the thousand possible . . . inventions, which are carried in the womb of its parent invention," and this innovation in turn produces new virtual potentials that "will or will not come into existence according to the extent and direction of the radiation of its imitation through communities which are already illuminated by other lights" (LI, p. 45).
Admittedly, when Tarde writes specifically about crowds he reproduces many of the stereotypical assumptions of his time. He argues, for example, that crowds are essentially an outmoded face-to-face phenomenon in an age of mass publics and waxes anxious over the potential of crowds to erupt violently out of relatively civilized publics.
49 But I think all his conventional fearmongering about the crowd as "a wild beast without a name" 50 should not distract us from recognizing that, in a deeper and more interesting sense, Tarde's entire sociology of imitation is a theory of crowd emergence.
Tarde may not, as Christian Borch points out, offer us much in the way of a positive model of how sociological, institutional dynamics affect the waxing and waning of mimetic energy. But, crucially, he gets us away from the static quasi-drama of autonomy versus heteronomy by rejecting both heroic individual agency and the pathos of institutional domination. Instead, Tarde proposes (what is actually) a dialectical dynamic of mutual mediation in which both leaders and followers are constituted through the subtle orchestration and actualization of deep systemic potentials.
The key figure in Tarde Tarde is quite explicit about the virtual orientation that each of us may have toward an image or a gesture, flashing up at a certain moment, that suddenly allows us to recognize ourselves: "There is in the magnetised subject a certain potential force of belief and desire which is anchored in all kinds of sleeping but unforgotten memories, and . . . this force seeks expression just as the water of a lake seeks an outlet. The magnetiser is able through a chain of singular circumstances to open the necessary outlet to this force. . . . Nor is it necessary for the magnetiser to speak in order to be believed and obeyed. He need only act; an almost imperceptible gesture is sufficient" (LI, p. 51).
Tarde's magnetizer, far more than most crowd leaders, is an ambiguous figure and for that reason perhaps also all the more plausible. In Le Bon as in McDougall, the common turning of a crowd toward its leader is a moment in which self-possession comes undone and tyranny is inaugurated. But, in Tarde, the magnetizer's power is inseparable from the emergent actualization of the crowd that takes form around him. In a sense, the magnetizer dominates; the smallest gesture suffices for him to be "believed and obeyed." But the magnetizer's authority also depends on the magnetized subject's self-recognition in the magnetizer's gesture. In that way the magnetizer, while leading, also follows. His power is conditional on the emergent coming-to-self of his public, although that public may certainly proceed to fetishize the energy they have produced together as a power inherent to the magnetizer.
51 Magnetic efficacy is ideological interpella-51. I write of the magnetizer's "public" advisedly, for Tarde soon extended his discussion to cover the work of publicists in a modern mass mediated context. Whereas the crowd, for Tarde, was a face-to-face phenomenon, the public was a "purely spiritual collectivity, a dispersion of individuals who are physically separated and whose cohesion is entirely mental." The journalist did for the public what the magnetizer had done for the crowd, but in a less immediately palpable manner. He was "the common inspiration of them all and . . . himself all the more fascinating for being invisible and unknown" ("PC," pp. 277, 278). Prefiguring much later studies as diverse as Jürgen Habermas's The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere (1962), Benedict Anderson's Imagined Communities (1991), and Michael Warner's Publics and Counterpublics (2002), Tarde located the birth of the public at that historical moment "when men given to the same study were too numerous to know each other personally" ("PC," p. 280), thus giving rise to a distinctively modern anonymous intimacy. And it was into this anonymously intimate field that the publicist-as-magnetizer could intervene:
How often one sees publicists create their own public! For Edouard Drumont to resuscitate antisemitism it was necessary that his initial attempts at agitation respond to a certain state tion, but it is also mobile and transient. It depends on "a chain of singular circumstances" that presumably must always be renegotiated and renewed. Ultimately, it seems to me, the magnetizer may even be internal; he may mark our internal distance from ourselves, whether consciously reflexive or not, and might thus also offer a way of thinking about Canetti's pleasurable gift of mimesis. Echoing Bergson, Tarde argues that all perception implies an embodied repetition of ourselves: "every act of perception, in as much as it involves an act of memory, which it always does, implies a kind of habit, an unconscious imitation of self by self" (LI, p. 75).
As a theory of virtuality and emergence, Tarde's model of society as imitation allows for the kind of immanent collective creativity that multitude theory celebrates as "producing the common." But because the magnetizer is also-indeed perhaps above all-a medium, Tarde's vision does not require the artificial opposition between immanence and mediation that will define the multitude's phobic rejection of the crowd.
Habit in Motion
Something subtler and more indeterminate opens up here. We are no longer rushing headlong into hell with the crowd or toward the millennial moment of the multitude. I am tempted to say that the space disclosed in this relation between immanent potentials and their magnetized mediation is an ethical space before it is a political space. That is to say, it is a space concerned more with the question of how we become what we can be in relation to each other than with the question of where we are going. It may seem strange that an open-ended space of ethical inquiry could ever arise out of the discourse on crowds, given how politically compromised that discourse is by its will to mastery. But actually this is not so surprising; it is often a regulatory discourse that bears the most intimate imprint of the potentials it seeks to police.
To be sure, one often has the sense that the crowd theorists rush to of mind among the population; but as long as no voice made itself heard, echoed and expressed this state of mind, it remained purely individual, with little intensity and even less contagion, unaware of itself. He who expressed it created it as a collective force, artificial perhaps, yet nonetheless real. ["PC," p. 282]
While publics are subject, like crowds, to mutual contagion, Tarde also introduces a new distinction here. Unlike in his earlier work on imitation, he is now able to speak of a "state of mind" as "purely individual" until the work of the publicist enables its social amplification. To my mind, this distinction introduces an unhelpful obstacle in that it makes our participation in the "social rivers" of "currents of opinion" ("PC," p. 278) seem an intermittent interruption of a baseline state of individual isolation. Such an assumption, if it ever was plausible, certainly seems untenable today in our hyper / multimediated age.
foreclose any destabilizing potential within their own discourse. The generative potential of crowds is anxiously pathologized; their mimetic dynamic is quickly banalized. But something similar happens with Hardt and Negri's multitudes as well. Ironically, a theoretical discourse so deeply defined by its phobia toward mediation is nevertheless so completely premediated by a political telos that, in its given form, it becomes all but analytically useless as a tool with which to explore the movement of any actually existing social formations. It always already has us hurtling towards a revolutionary climax, craning our necks to catch a glimpse of the receding place where our destination was predecided. Rather than galloping ahead in the name of politics, why not dwell more experimentally in the places where a social field rippled by the reverberations of embodied affects is mediated and re-mediated through more or less authorized narratives and practices? If the relation of the multitude to the crowd is about anything important, then it is, I think, about this: the relation between vital potential and the social mediations that at once produce and constrain that potential. The point is not to oppose ethics to politics; rather, it is to resist the trampling of the delicate ethical ground of social becoming and mutual making in the mad rush to the end of history.
Perhaps this, then, is the paradoxical lesson that emerges from a rereading of the multitude in light of the crowd: in order to become truly autonomous, the multitude must give up its dream of immaculate immediacy. Mimesis, of which the crowd is the collective symptom, which would at first sight seem to signal slavish dependence on external authority, emerges as the site of a transformative self-relation at a level that is at once individual and collective. Moreover, it is a transformative self-relation that is, in a truly dialectical sense, both reflexive and rooted in the sensuously social resonances of embodied habit.
Mimesis is habit in motion. It contains within itself Tarde's dyad of imitation and innovation. And it situates us in the organic world. Bergson once argued that our difference from other animals is a matter of degree, that the greater complexity of our nervous system means only more delay in our response to stimuli-and, because of this delay, more opportunities for stimuli to reveal unexpected potentialities vis-à-vis the embodied experiences that we bring to bear on them. For Bergson, our humanity was thus manifested in our (unearned) "power to value the useless," that is to say, to blunder off the path of utilitarian entrainment (MM, p. 83). But we also recuperate this blundering in more or less conscious ways. The gap between stimulus and response is where we are interrupted and productively derailed, by ourselves and by each other. The gap is indeed a space of unpredictable emergences. But it is not external to the mediations of struc-tured social relations; rather, it is a moment in their enactment. As Lauren Berlant points out, the "moments of potential collapse" that always threaten any performance of social normativity are more often than not internal to the generic conventions of the social practices that are being enacted, adding to the richness of our investment in them rather than heralding some insurgent transformation. 52 The moment of productive derailment does not haunt social structures of mediation from outside; rather, it is the ghost in the machine that often ties our identifications and affective commitments all the more tightly to practices and roles that contain the potentials we may subsequently recognize as reactionary or revolutionary. What Bergson also called our "will to dream" is neither only an immanent domain of unmediated emergence nor only an ideological simulacrum of freedom (MM, p. 83). Rather, it is the constitutive excess that is the moment of generative possibility in all social relations. Perhaps it is in this gap that an ethics of collective life worthy of us as multitudes comes to life. 
